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On its face, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115466) appears to offer an across-the-board
reduction in individual marginal rates along with
an additional 20 percent reduction in rates on
unincorporated business income. Such a
description oversimplifies the effect of the act. In
fact, the rate reductions in the TCJA are uneven
and play out in surprising ways. For example, the
new rate structure raises rates on some taxpayers
and shows a strong preference for married
taxpayers over unmarried taxpayers, expanding

marriage bonuses and corresponding singles
penalties.
Examination of the new deduction for
unincorporated business income suggests that the
effect of the deduction goes well beyond a 20
percent reduction in marginal rates on business
income. The deduction has the effect of not only
lowering rate schedules but also shifting brackets.
As a result, rates on business income can drop by
well over 20 percent, and rates on nonbusiness
income are also reduced for business owners. On
the other hand, the phaseouts built into the new
provision have the opposite effect, increasing
marginal rates on business and nonbusiness
income — in some cases to more than 60 percent.
This report also looks at the preexisting rules
for capital gains and notes the surprising fact that
the presence of capital gains can increase rates on
ordinary income, despite the apparent separation
between the computation of tax on ordinary
income and capital gains. This leads to odd
results, such as that in the presence of capital
gains, increasing ordinary income can lower
ordinary income rates.
Comparing Rates Under Old and New Law
It is difficult to directly compare rates under
old and new law because the definition of taxable
income is not the same. Because my intention is to
focus on changes to rates and not changes to the
tax base, I ignore both changes to the definition of
gross income and changes to itemized deductions.
I take into account the standard deduction and,
under old law, one or two personal exemptions
depending on marital status because I view those
provisions as integral to the rate structure. I
assume old-law personal exemptions are phased
out smoothly over the phaseout range and
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therefore have the effect of increasing marginal
rates by approximately 1.1 percent per
1
exemption. Given that the TCJA generally
increased gross income and reduced itemized
deductions, my calculations overstate the benefits
2
of new law.
For the time being, I also assume that none of
the income consists of capital gains or qualified
business income. The treatment of both types of
income is discussed extensively below. It is also
necessary to specify filing status. For this section I
compare rates for married individuals filing joint
returns (hereinafter simply “married”) and for

unmarried individuals other than heads of
households (hereinafter “unmarried” or
“single”). Doing so allows me to focus not only on
changes in marginal rates but also on changes to
marriage penalties and bonuses. In subsequent
sections, for ease of presentation, I limit the
analysis to married taxpayers.
Figure 1 shows marginal rates for married
taxpayers as a function of taxable income under
old law (Line A) and new law (Line B).3 As
expected, marginal rates are almost always lower
under new law by an amount that ranges from 1
to 9 percentage points. The exceptions are for the
10 percent and 35 percent brackets, which are
4
unchanged over substantial regions.

1

1.1 percent = 33 percent * $4,150/$125,000. For married taxpayers, the
phaseout is partially in the 35 percent bracket, implying an effective rate
of 1.2 percent per exemption, or 2.4 percent for a married couple. I do not
take into account the overall limitation on itemized deductions, which
would increase the marginal rate an additional 0.99 percent to 1.19
percent depending on the taxpayer’s bracket.
2

Others have looked at the overall impact of the tax changes by
income level. See, e.g., Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center,
“Distributional Analysis of the Conference Agreement for the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act” (Dec. 18, 2017).

3

All figures are based on 2018 numbers. For new law, the rate
schedule is provided in section 1(j). For old law, the rate schedule takes
into account inflation adjustments for 2018 as determined before the
enactment of the TCJA. See Rev. Proc. 2017-58, 2017-45 IRB 489.
4

If the phaseout of the personal exemptions is ignored, the new 35
percent bracket includes a region of the old 33 percent bracket and
therefore represents an increase in marginal rates under new law.
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Figure 2 shows marginal rates for unmarried
taxpayers. As with Figure 1, Line A represents old
law, and Line B represents new law. Figure 2
suggests a different story for unmarried
taxpayers. As with married taxpayers, the 10
percent bracket is mostly unchanged, and tax
rates are reduced in the old 15 and 25 percent
brackets. Starting in the old 28 percent bracket,
however, the relationship between new law and
old law flips. For an extended range of income,
from the start of the new 32 percent bracket (an
adjusted gross income of about $170,000) to the
start of the old 35 percent bracket (an AGI of about
$430,000),5 the rates under new law exceed the
6
rates under old law.

5

The old 35 percent bracket is difficult to see in Figure 2 because it
extends from an AGI of $431,450 to only $433,200 before increasing to
39.6 percent.

Figure 3 shows the tax savings under new law
relative to old law as a function of AGI. Line
A shows the savings for married taxpayers, and
Line B shows the savings for unmarried
taxpayers. Line C is explained below. As before, I
focus only on rate changes, the repeal of the
personal exemption, and the standard deduction.
The savings for married and unmarried
taxpayers are starkly different. For married
taxpayers, the tax savings line is relatively
straight, rising at roughly a constant percentage of
income. For unmarried taxpayers, the savings
initially rise in proportion to AGI, but at about
$170,000 the savings start to fall and drops close to
zero at about $430,000. This drop in tax savings
for unmarried taxpayers follows from the fact that
marginal rates are higher in this range under new
law. After about $430,000 the new rates are lower
than old rates, and the tax savings begin to rise
parallel to, but well below, the savings for married
taxpayers.

6

There is a minor exception. In the AGI range from about $205,000 to
$220,000, the old rate is 33 percent and the new rate is 32 percent.
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Why were unmarried taxpayers treated more
harshly than married taxpayers? Presumably, that
decision came from a desire to further reduce
marriage penalties implicit in the rate structure.
Explaining the changes requires a little
background. The question of how marriage
should affect tax liability has been a long-standing
problem for the federal income tax. In an
individual-based system, such as the Social
Security payroll tax, tax liability is independent of
marital status. In a system of joint filing, however,
the tax effect of marriage will depend on the size
of the married brackets relative to the unmarried
brackets, and on the relative income of the two
individuals.
If the married brackets are equal to the
unmarried brackets, marriage will have no effect
on a single-earner couple but will generally
increase the tax liability of a two-earner couple.
This marriage penalty will be largest for equal-

earner couples. At the other extreme, if the
married brackets are equal to twice the unmarried
brackets, marriage will have no effect on an equalearner couple but will generally decrease the tax
liability of an unequal-earner couple. This
marriage bonus will increase the more uneven the
earnings of the two individuals, and it will be
largest for single-earner couples.
In between the extremes of equal brackets and
double brackets, the mix between marriage
penalty and marriage bonus will depend on the
balance of income between the two individuals.
The more equal their incomes, the more there will
tend to be a marriage penalty. The more unequal
the incomes, the more there will tend to be a
marriage bonus.
The flip side of a marriage bonus is, of course,
a singles penalty (and the flip side of a marriage
penalty is a singles bonus). Thus, there is an
unavoidable trade-off: the narrower the married

1914
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brackets, the greater the marriage penalty; the
wider the married brackets, the greater the singles
penalty. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1969, there
were not separate rate schedules for married
filing jointly and unmarried individuals, but
7
rather a single rate schedule for individuals.
Married individuals filing jointly were taxed on
twice the tax computed on half their joint income.8
The effect was to make implicit married brackets
that were twice the unmarried brackets, creating
large marriage bonuses and singles penalties. In
response to complaints from singles, Congress
introduced the current structure with explicit rate
schedules for married filing jointly and
unmarried taxpayers. The relative size of the
married and unmarried brackets varied over time
and across brackets. In TRA 1986 Congress
compromised and set married brackets at 167
9
percent of the unmarried brackets. The effect of
that compromise along with a relatively flat rate
structure was to moderate both the marriage
bonus (singles penalty) and the marriage penalty
(singles bonus).
Over time the compromise broke down in two
ways. As more and more married couples became
dual earners and tax rates rose after TRA 1986,
complaints about the marriage penalty grew.
Congress responded in 2001 by moving back to
the 200 percent standard, but only at lower
10
income levels. For married taxpayers, the
standard deduction, the newly introduced 10
percent bracket, and the existing 15 percent
bracket were each set to double the unmarried
11
amounts. At the other end of the income scale
there was severe bracket compression. In an
extreme example, when President Clinton called
for a 10 percent surtax on “millionaires” in 1993, it

7

See section 1 before amendment by section 803(a) of TRA 1969 (P.L.
91-172). There was a second rate schedule for heads of households.
8

See section 2 before amendment by section 803(b) of TRA 1969.

9

Compare section 1(a), with section 1(c) as amended by section 101(a)
of TRA 1986 (P.L. 99-514), and see section 63(c)(2) as amended by section
102(a) of TRA 1986.
10

Congress had earlier responded by enacting a two-earner
deduction in 1981. See former section 221, added by section 103 of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34). The deduction was
repealed in 1986. See section 131(a) of TRA 1986.
11

See sections 63(c)(2), 1(i)(1), and 1(f)(8) as amended by sections 301,
101, and 302, respectively, of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-16).

was triggered at $250,000 for both married and
unmarried taxpayers.12
By 2018 the relationship between the brackets
was set to be as shown in Table 1. Only the 25
percent bracket remained at 167 percent, the TRA
1986 standard. The lower brackets and the
standard deduction were each set at double for
married taxpayers. The upper brackets went in
the opposite direction. The 28 percent, 33 percent,
and 35 percent brackets were set at 122 percent,
100 percent, and 113 percent of their respective
individual brackets. Thus, old law was a
combination of no marriage penalty and generous
marriage bonuses at lower income levels with
significant marriage penalties at upper income
levels.13 Using 2018 inflation-adjusted figures, the
maximum marriage penalty because of the rate
structure had risen to more than $34,000. Also, the
threshold for the overall limitation on itemized
deductions for married taxpayers was set at only
120 percent of the unmarried level, potentially
14
adding about $2,500 to the marriage penalty.
The TCJA greatly expanded the marriage
bonus region and correspondingly shrank the
marriage penalty. Under new law, all brackets up
until the 35 percent bracket have married cutoffs
15
that are 200 percent of the unmarried cutoffs. It is
only the line between the 35 percent and 37
percent brackets where a marriage penalty
remains. For unmarried taxpayers, the 37 percent
bracket starts at $500,000, while for married
taxpayers the bracket starts at $600,000, only 120
percent of the unmarried level. Thus, the 35
percent married bracket ends $400,000 short of the

12

Compare section 1(a), with section 1(c), as amended by section
13201(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66).
The 39.6 percent bracket represented a 10 percent surcharge on the 36
percent bracket. See Gwen Ifill, “Few to Pay More in Income Taxes,
President Insists,” The New York Times, Feb. 17, 1993, at A1
(“Administration officials said such a tax would probably affect only
millionaires.”).
13

In this report I consider marriage penalties only from the rate
brackets, the standard deductions, and a few key phaseout provisions.
There are other examples of marriage penalties and bonuses throughout
the code. In particular, the earned income tax credit imposes substantial
marriage penalties on low-income taxpayers. See section 32.
14

$2,535 = 39.6 percent * (3 percent * (2 * $266,700 - $320,000)). The
personal exemption phaseout also had a marriage penalty, but by the
time a couple’s income reached the level necessary to trigger the
maximum marriage penalty, the personal exemptions would have been
fully phased out regardless of whether they were married. See sections
151(d)(3)(A) and 68(b)(1).
15

The repeal of the overall limitation on itemized deductions further
shrinks the marriage penalty. See section 68(f).
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Married Versus Unmarried Brackets and Related Provisions Under Old and New Law
Married Bracket
Ends

Rate

Unmarried Bracket
Ends

Ratio Married/
Unmarried

Old law brackets
10%

$19,050

$9,525

200%

15%

$77,400

$38,700

200%

25%

$156,150

$93,700

167%

28%

$237,950

$195,450

122%

33%

$424,950

$424,950

100%

35%

$480,050

$426,700

113%

10%

$19,050

$9,525

200%

12%

$77,400

$38,700

200%

22%

$165,000

$82,500

200%

24%

$315,000

$157,500

200%

32%

$400,000

$200,000

200%

35%

$600,000

$500,000

120%

39.6%
New law brackets

37%

Married

Unmarried

Ratio Married/
Unmarried

Old law amounts
Standard deduction

$13,000

$6,500

200%

Personal exemption phaseout threshold

$320,000

$266,700

120%

Section 68 threshold

$320,000

$266,700

120%

$24,000

$12,000

200%

Personal exemption phaseout threshold

N/A

N/A

N/A

Section 68 threshold

N/A

N/A

N/A

New law amounts
Standard dedution

$1 million that would be available to two highearning single individuals.
Under new law, a marriage penalty can occur
for two individuals only if their combined taxable
income exceeds $600,000, and the maximum
marriage penalty is $8,000, less than one quarter

the maximum penalty under old law.16 Along with
a reduction in marriage penalties for relatively

16

$8,000 is equal to the 2 percent rate differential between the 37
percent and 35 percent brackets times the $400,000 difference between
the married bracket and twice the single bracket. The TCJA also
eliminated the marriage penalty in the phaseout of the child credit.
Compare section 24(h)(3) (threshold of $400,000 for married taxpayers is
200 percent of $200,000 threshold for unmarried taxpayers), with section
24(b)(2) (threshold of $110,000 for married taxpayers is 147 percent of
$75,000 threshold for unmarried taxpayers).
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equal-earner couples, the TCJA increased
marriage bonuses for unequal-earner couples.
Under old law, the maximum marriage bonus was
17
$13,373. Under new law, the maximum marriage
bonus has increased substantially to $30,750.18 The
TCJA has come close to returning to the pre-TRA
1969 treatment of married couples.
It was because of marriage penalties being
decreased and marriage bonuses increased that
rate reductions for unmarried taxpayers
necessarily had to be less generous than rate
reductions for married taxpayers. After all, the
flip side of a marriage bonus is a singles penalty.
Consider again Figure 3, this time comparing Line
A with Line C. Line A, remember, shows the tax
savings for a married couple. Line C shows the tax
savings for an equal-earner unmarried couple
with the same aggregate income. The two lines are
identical up until an AGI of $177,450. That is the
point at which under old law an equal-earner
married couple hit the top of the 25 percent
19
bracket and began to pay a marriage penalty. The
TCJA’s removal of the marriage penalty meant
that from that point on, the act’s treatment of
married couples was relatively more generous
than its treatment of unmarried couples.
Marginal Rates by Income Type
The analysis so far has compared marginal
rates and tax burdens on ordinary income under
the TCJA and prior law. In this section, I broaden
the focus on the TCJA to consider marginal rates
on different classes of income, examining in
particular the new qualified business income
20
(QBI) deduction’s effect on marginal rates.
Section 199A provides a deduction for 20 percent
of QBI. It is natural to think of the provision as
simply reducing marginal rates by 20 percent. For

17

The maximum bonus was reached under old law when an
individual earning at least $493,050 married an individual with zero
income because it allowed full use of the married standard deduction
and all brackets below 39.6 percent.
18

The maximum bonus is reached when an individual earning at
least $624,000 marries an individual with zero income because it allows
full use of the married standard deduction and all brackets below 37
percent.
19

The top of the 25 percent bracket was $156,150. Adding the
standard deduction ($13,000) and two personal exemptions ($4,150 each)
gives a total of $177,450.
20

In this section I assume that the W-2 constraint is not binding and
that the business activity is not a specified service trade or business. See
section 199A(b)(2) and (d)(2). I consider those restrictions infra.

example, the 35 percent bracket would become
the 28 percent bracket. In fact, the situation is
more complicated. Because section 199A operates
by reducing taxable income, it can have the
secondary effect of shifting the taxpayer into a
lower bracket, and the rate reduction for QBI can
therefore exceed 20 percent. Moreover, the
reduction in taxable income can shift the rate
bracket for other types of income, both ordinary
income and capital gain. As a corollary, the
marginal rate on all types of income depends on
the balance of business income to nonbusiness
income. That makes any discussion of marginal
rates more complicated.
For example, consider two taxpaying couples,
both married with no children, both taking the
standard deduction, and both with $24,000 of
ordinary income offset by the standard
deduction. I use the term “ordinary income” here
to refer to income such as wages and interest that
qualifies for neither long-term capital gains rates
nor the QBI deduction under section 199A.
Assume the first couple, whom I call Wage
Couple, has additional wages of $77,400. Assume
the second couple, whom I call Business Couple,
has additional QBI of $77,400.
Wage Couple will be at the threshold of the 22
percent bracket. Therefore, their marginal rate on
incremental income will be:
Ordinary income

22 percent

Business income

17.6 percent (80 percent * 22 percent)

Capital gains

15 percent

By contrast, Business Couple will still be well
within the 12 percent bracket because they will get
a deduction of 20 percent of their business
income. Therefore, their taxable income will be
only $61,920. Their marginal rate on incremental
income will be:
Ordinary income

12 percent

Business income

9.6 percent (80 percent * 12 percent)

Capital gains

0 percent

Business Couple’s 9.6 percent marginal rate on
QBI represents a 45 percent reduction in Wage
Couple’s 22 percent marginal rate on ordinary
income, rather than a 20 percent reduction as
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might be expected. Moreover, Business Couple’s
marginal rate on ordinary income, such as interest
on a savings account or wages, is 10 percentage
points lower than Wage Couple’s rate on the same
income. And Business Couple could earn more
than $15,280 in capital gains and pay no tax, while
Wage Couple would pay $2,292 in capital gains
tax on the same income.21
Figure 4 shows marginal rates on incremental
ordinary, business, and capital gains income for
married taxpayers whose baseline income is
either ordinary or QBI. Lines A, C, and E (the solid
lines) assume a baseline of ordinary income (like
Wage Couple), and lines B, D, and F (the dashed
lines) assume a baseline of QBI (like Business
Couple). Consider first the solid lines that assume
an ordinary baseline. Line A is simply the
statutory rates in section 1(j) and shows the

21

$15,280 = $77,200 - $61,920. See infra note 40 (discussing the fact that
the 15 percent bracket starts at $77,200 rather than $77,400, as might be
expected).

marginal rate on $1 of additional ordinary
income. Line C shows the marginal rate on $1 of
business income given that all other income is
ordinary and is simply 80 percent of Line A.
Finally, Line E is the marginal rates on $1 of capital
gains given a baseline of ordinary income. Line E
reflects the capital gains rates and brackets in
section 1(h) as amended by section 1(j)(5).
Now compare the dashed lines that assume a
QBI baseline. In each case the assumption is that
other than $24,000 of ordinary income offset by
the standard deduction, all income is QBI. As a
result, taxable income is reduced by 20 percent,
which has the effect of shifting the rate brackets to
the right. The rightward shift is by a constant
factor of 1.25 and therefore increases with income.
Moreover, the rate brackets are shifted to the right
not only for business income (Line D) but also for
ordinary income (Line B) and capital gains (Line
F). The new QBI deduction thus offers a double
benefit: It not only lowers the marginal rate within
each bracket but also delays the start of each new
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bracket. And this second benefit is shared with
ordinary income and capital gains.22 Figure 4
shows the brackets on incremental income
assuming that QBI makes up all (dashed lines B,
D, and F) or none (solid lines A, C, and E) of the
taxpayer’s baseline income. If the taxpayer’s
baseline income consists of a mix of ordinary
income and QBI, the start of each bracket will be
shifted somewhere between the solid and dashed
lines.
Effect of the Phaseout of the QBI Deduction
The discussion so far has assumed away
significant constraints on the QBI deduction. In
this section I focus on two constraints: the
treatment of specified service businesses and the
W-2 constraint. To generate QBI, a business
23
cannot be a specified service trade or business. A
specified service trade or business is a trade or
business described in section 1202(e)(3)(A),
applied without regard to the words
“engineering” and “architecture,” or a business
that involves the performance of services
consisting of investing and investment
management; trading; or dealing in securities,
partnership interests, or commodities.24 Section
1202(e)(3)(A) includes:
any trade or business involving the
performance of services in the fields of
health, law, [engineering, architecture,]
accounting, actuarial science, performing
arts, consulting, athletics, financial
services, brokerage services, or any trade
or business where the principal asset of
such trade or business is the reputation or
25
skill of 1 or more of its employees.

26

regard to the section 199A deduction). For
married taxpayers, the specified service exception
does not apply if taxable income is less than
$315,000, and the deduction is phased out on a pro
rata basis between $315,000 and $415,000.27 Any
time there is a phaseout of a tax benefit (or phasein of a tax penalty), the effect is to increase
effective marginal rates over the phaseout range.
The computation of marginal rates is made more
complicated given that the W-2 constraint is
phased in over the same range over which the
exception to the specified services disallowance is
phased out. For now, I assume that the W-2
constraint is nonbinding and therefore can be
ignored. Below, I consider the effect of a binding
W-2 constraint.
The specified service phaseout affects the
marginal rate on both ordinary and business
income as long as the taxpayer has any business
income. The extreme case is when all the
taxpayer’s income (beyond the standard
deduction) is business income. In that case the
effective marginal rates on incremental ordinary
and business income in the phaseout range can be
expressed as follows:
tord = t§1(TI) (1 + 0.2 B/R)
tbus = t§1(TI) (1 - 0.2 (Θ + R - B)/R + 0.2 B/R)
TI = B (1 - 0.2 (Θ + R - B)/R)
where,
tord, tbus effective marginal rate on
incremental ordinary and business
income
t§1(TI)  statutory marginal rates on
ordinary income at the current level of
taxable income

The statute, however, provides an exception
to the specified service disallowance based on the
taxpayer’s taxable income (computed without

TI  taxable income after the allowance of
the section 199A deduction
B  the amount of QBI (all of which is
assumed to come from specified service
activities)

22

Although not shown, the effects on unmarried taxpayers are
qualitatively similar.
23

Θ, R  the phaseout threshold and range

See section 199A(d)(1)(A).

24

See section 199A(d)(2).

25

Section 199A(d)(2)(A) also modifies the rule in section 1202(e)(3)(A)
to consider the reputation of owners as well as employees. Read literally,
a specified service business includes a firm providing engineering or
architectural services so long as the principal asset of the firm is the
reputation of its employees or owners. That interpretation would likely
treat most engineering and architectural firms as specified service
businesses and would not seem to be the intent of the drafters.

26

See section 199A(d)(3) and (g)(2)(B).

27

See section 199A(d)(3) and (e)(3). The phaseout threshold and range
for unmarried taxpayers is half of the amounts for married taxpayers.
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In both cases, the term t§1(TI) (0.2 B/R) reflects
the increase in tax liability because of the pro rata
loss of the QBI deduction over the phaseout
range. For the effective marginal rate on business
income, tbus, the additional term t§1(TI)(0.2(Θ + R B)/R) reflects the reduction in marginal rates from
the non-phased-out portion of the QBI deduction.
Figure 5 shows the effect of the phaseout on
effective marginal rates. Consider first the left
portion of the graph up to $315,000 in prededuction taxable income, the threshold for the
specified service phaseout. Given the assumption
that the taxpayer’s baseline taxable income is all
QBI, the left portion of the graph is identical to
lines B, D, and F (the dashed lines) in Figure 4.
Line A of Figure 5 shows the marginal rate on
ordinary income and is a shifted version of the
statutory rate tables. Line B shows the marginal
rate on business income, and its height is simply
80 percent of the solid line. Line C shows the
unshifted statutory ordinary income rate for
reference purposes. For example, Line C jumps

from 12 percent to 22 percent at $77,400, while
Line A jumps at $96,750.28
At $315,000, the phaseout of the QBI
deduction starts, and it continues for $100,000
until income reaches $415,000. Once income
exceeds $415,000, the QBI deduction has been
fully phased out. At that point the effective rate on
both ordinary and (specified service) business
income have merged with the statutory rate on
ordinary income.
The range of greatest interest is the phaseout
range. Starting at $315,000, for every $1,000
dollars in incremental earnings — whether
ordinary or business earnings — the taxpayer
loses 1 percent of the entire QBI deduction. That
has the effect of immediately increasing the
marginal rate by about 15.1 percentage points,
leading to marginal rates of 39.1 percent on
ordinary income rather than the statutory rate of

28

$96,750 = 1.25 * $77,400.
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24 percent. Incremental business income is taxed
at a rate of 34.3 percent.29 Capital gains income
does not trigger the phaseout of the section 199A
deduction because taxable income for this
purpose does not generally include capital gains.30
The marginal rates in the phaseout range are
not constant, however, continuing to climb
between $315,000 and $415,000. As can be seen
from the graph, the marginal rate on each type of
income creeps up and then jumps in two steps,
like a poorly constructed staircase with tilted
treads and uneven risers. The upward slope
between the jumps is generated because as the
amount of business income increases, so does the
tax cost of phasing out the deduction. The jumps
are caused by the lagged increases in the statutory
rate. For example, there is a jump at about
$357,000 of QBI that is a delayed reaction to the
increase in statutory rates from 24 percent to 32
percent that occurs at a taxable income of
$315,000. The 8 percentage point increase in the
statutory rate causes a 13.7 percentage point
increase in the effective marginal rate on ordinary
income and a 12.8 percentage point increase in the
effective marginal rate on business income.
By the end of the phaseout range, the marginal
rates have risen substantially, with the rate on
both ordinary and business income rising to a
31
peak of 64 percent. Note that the effective rate
increases with both the rate of the business
deduction and the phaseout threshold. In the
version of the TCJA originally passed by the
Senate, the deduction rate was 23 percent and the
phaseout began at $500,000.32 Under the Senate
bill, the effective marginal rate would have been
as high as 83 percent.
So far, I have effectively ignored the W-2
constraint by assuming it is not binding. Section
199A limits the QBI deduction from each qualified
business to the greater of:
• 50 percent of the W-2 wages; and

• 25 percent of the W-2 wages plus 2.5 percent
of the unadjusted basis of qualified
33
property.
As with the specified service exception, the W2 constraint is phased in for married taxpayers
between $315,000 and $415,000 of taxable income,
determined without regard to the section 199A
deduction.34 The allowable deduction during the
phaseout range is the weighted average of the
unconstrained and constrained deductions, with
the weights based on the percentage of the way
through the phaseout range. Assuming the W-2
constraint is binding, the deduction during the
phaseout range can be expressed as the following
formula:
(1 - p) (0.2B) + p (W2)
where:
p  the percentage of the way through the
35
phase-in region
B  the amount of QBI
W2  the amount of the W-2 constraint
If the business is also a specified service
business, the specified service disallowance and
the W-2 constraint are phased in at the same time.
The QBI deduction can then be expressed as:
36

(1 - p) ((1 - p) (0.2B) + p (W2))

Figure 6 shows the effect of both the phase-in
of the W-2 constraint and the phaseout of the
specified service allowance on the amount of the
QBI deduction. Figure 6 assumes that after an
amount equal to the standard deduction, all the
taxpayer’s income is from a qualified business.
Line A shows the section 199A deduction without
regard to either limitation — it is simply 20

33

29

15.1 percent = 24 percent * (0.2 * $315,000/$100,000). 34.3 percent =
80 percent * 24 percent + 15.1 percent.
30

See section 1(h). See the discussion of capital gains in the next
section for a description of how section 1(h) operates.
31

64 percent = 35 percent * (1 + (0.2 * $415,000/$100,000)).

32

See the version of section 199A(a)(2) and (e)(2)(A) in section 11011
of H.R. 1, as passed by the Senate on December 2, 2017. The effective rate
decreases with the length of the phaseout range. The phaseout range was
the same in the Senate bill and the final legislation.

See section 199A(b)(2)(B). The term “W-2 wages” is defined to
include both wages and elective contributions to section 401(k) plans
and similar plans. See section 199A(4)(A), cross-referencing section
6051(a)(3) (wages within the meaning of section 3121(a)) and section
6051(a)(8) (elective deferrals). Nonelective deferrals are not counted.
34

See section 199A(b)(3).

35

p = (Taxable Income - Threshold)/Range. The expression (1 - p) is
defined as the “applicable percentage” by section 199A(d)(3)(B).
36

See section 199A(d)(3)(A)(ii) (providing a rule for the interaction
between the specified service phaseout and the W-2 constraint phase-in).
If the income is from a specified service business and the W-2 constraint
is not binding, the allowable deduction is (1 - p) (0.2B).
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percent of income. Line B shows a hypothetical
W-2 constraint arbitrarily set at $30,000.
Lines C, D, and E show the phaseout or phasedown of the deduction under different
assumptions. Line C assumes that the W-2
constraint is binding at $30,000 and that the
income is not from a specified service business.
Line D assumes the W-2 constraint is not binding
but that the income is from a specified service
business. The specified service phaseout is more
steeply sloped than the W-2 constraint phase-in
because of the assumption that the W-2 constraint
is greater than zero. If the W-2 constraint were
zero (rather than $30,000), lines C and D would be
identical. Both are bowed out because the amount
of business income is assumed to be increasing
and, therefore, the underlying deduction is
increasing while it is being phased out. Line E
assumes both that the W-2 constraint is binding at
$30,000 and that the income is from a specified
service business. The combined phaseout is
steeper than the phaseout from either provision

taken alone and is bowed in because of the
interaction effect of the two restrictions.
Figure 7 shows the marginal rates on ordinary
and business income that flow from the
assumptions that the W-2 constraint is fixed at
$30,000 and that all the income (after the standard
deduction) is from a specified service business.
Figure 7 should be compared with Figure 5, which
shows the same information assuming that the W2 constraint is not binding. As shown in Figure 6,
the effect of the combination of the specified
service phaseout and the phase-in of a binding W2 constraint is to accelerate the phaseout of the
deduction. This acceleration results in a frontloaded increase in the effective marginal rate. As
the phaseout progresses, the effective rate
declines steeply, only to jump up again as each
new partially shifted bracket is entered. At the
start of the phaseout, the taxpayer is in the 24
percent bracket but faces a marginal rate on
ordinary income of 47 percent. The marginal rate
on ordinary income declines to 44 percent and, at
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the start of the 32 percent bracket, jumps up again
to 58 percent. It then declines steeply to 45
percent. At the start of the 35 percent bracket, the
marginal rate jumps to 49 percent and declines
again to 46 percent by the end of the phaseout
range. The marginal rates for QBI are lower but
follow the same pattern, reaching a peak of 55.4
percent.
The shape of the marginal rate curve depends
on the assumed W-2 constraint. In the extreme, if
the W-2 constraint is zero, the marginal rates on
ordinary income in the phaseout range would
look a little steeper than in Figure 7, with slightly
higher peaks for ordinary income of 54 percent
and 62 percent for the 24 percent and 32 percent
brackets, and a lower peak of 42 percent
corresponding to the 35 percent bracket. The peak
rate on QBI would be 59 percent. Between a
constraint of $30,000 and no constraint, the shape
of the marginal rates shifts gradually from that
shown in Figure 7 to that shown in Figure 5.

Effect of Capital Gains on Ordinary Income Rates
The discussion in the previous sections
focused on the effects of the QBI deduction and
the interaction between that deduction and
marginal rates on other types of income. It makes
clear that there can be complex and presumably
unintended interactions between the marginal
rates on different types of income. It also
emphasizes that the statutory rates are just a
starting point in determining effective marginal
rates. In this section I examine whether there are
similar interactions between the special rates on
capital gains and the marginal rates on ordinary
income. I show that there is in fact an interaction
and provide a few examples of how it can play
out.
First, it is worth reviewing the basic rules for
the taxation of capital gains, which were not
substantially changed by the TCJA. Generally,
under section 1(h), tax is computed by first
subtracting net capital gains (defined to include
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qualified dividends) from taxable income to
calculate ordinary taxable income.37 Tax on
ordinary taxable income is computed based on
the section 1 ordinary rates. Tax on net capital
gains is computed at three rates: 0 percent, 15
38
percent, and 20 percent. Under prior law, the
starts of the 15 percent and 20 percent capital
gains brackets were tied to the starts of the 25
percent and 39.6 percent ordinary income
39
brackets. Under the TCJA, the capital gains
brackets have become unmoored from the
ordinary income brackets. For married taxpayers
in 2018, the 0 percent bracket ends at $77,200, and
the 15 percent bracket ends at $479,000.40 In
determining the rate on capital gains, however,
net capital gains are stacked on top of ordinary
taxable income. In other words, ordinary taxable
income effectively displaces lower-bracket capital
gains. Total tax liability is the sum of the tax on
ordinary taxable income plus the tax on net
41
capital gains.
Given that capital gain income is stacked on
top of ordinary income, it is not surprising that
increasing a taxpayer’s ordinary income can
increase the taxpayer’s marginal rate on capital
gains. For example, if a married couple has
$70,000 of taxable income, their marginal rate on
capital gains is zero. If the couple earned an
additional $10,000 in ordinary income, their
marginal rate on capital gains would be increased
to 15 percent.
By contrast, given that the tax on ordinary
income is computed after subtracting capital gain
from taxable income, it might seem that the

37

Net capital gain is defined by section 1221 (netting rules) and
section 1(h)(11) (inclusion of qualified dividends).
38

I am ignoring special categories of net capital gain that are taxed at
25 percent and 28 percent. See section 1(h)(6) (unrecaptured section 1250
gain) and 1(h)(4) (28 percent rate gain). I am also ignoring any effects
that operate through increasing AGI.
39

See section 1(h)(1)(B)(i) and (C)(ii)(I).

40

See section 1(j)(5). Oddly, the 15 percent capital gains bracket starts
at $77,200, while the 22 percent ordinary income bracket (the former 25
percent bracket) starts at $77,400. Compare section 1(j)(5)(B)(i), with
section 1(j)(2)(A). The effect is to create a brief range where the capital
gains rate of 15 percent exceeds the ordinary rate of 12 percent.
41

Although not usually expressed this way, the tax on capital gains
can be computed as the tax on all taxable income at capital gains rates
minus the tax on ordinary taxable income at capital gains rates. Total tax
liability, therefore, can be computed as the tax on ordinary taxable
income computed at ordinary rates plus the tax on all taxable income at
capital gains rates minus the tax on ordinary taxable income at capital
gains rates.

amount of capital gains would have no effect on
the marginal rate on ordinary income. That facile
conclusion is false as can be seen by a simple
example comparing two couples, Ordinary
Couple and Capital Couple. Ordinary Couple has
ordinary taxable income of $70,000 and no capital
gain. Their marginal rate on ordinary income is 12
percent based on their statutory bracket. Capital
Couple has the same $70,000 in ordinary income
but also has $10,000 in capital gains. Consider the
effect on Capital Couple’s tax liability of earning
another $1 of ordinary income. As with Ordinary
Couple, their marginal rate on ordinary taxable
income based on the ordinary tax brackets is 12
percent. Thus, the direct effect of earning another
$1 is a tax of 12 cents. But there is also an indirect
effect: The additional $1 of ordinary income
displaces $1 of capital gains that had been taxed at
0 percent and pushes it into the 15 percent capital
gains bracket, thus increasing Capital Couple’s tax
liability by another 15 cents. Combining both the
direct and indirect effects, the addition of the
capital gains income increases Capital Couple’s
effective marginal rate on ordinary income to 27
percent rather than the 12 percent rate faced by
Ordinary Couple.
The size of the indirect effect is determined by
the difference between the marginal rate on the
taxpayer’s last dollar of capital gain and the
marginal rate on their first dollar of capital gain,
and it can take one of four values: 0 percent, 5
percent, 15 percent, or 20 percent. The indirect
effect is 0 percent when the first and last dollar of
capital gains are in the same bracket. It is 15
percent or 20 percent when the first dollar is in the
0 percent bracket and the last dollar is in the 15
percent or 20 percent bracket, respectively. The
indirect effect is 5 percent when the first dollar of
capital gain is in the 15 percent bracket and the
last dollar of capital gain is in the 20 percent
bracket. For QBI, the indirect effect would be 80
percent of the indirect effect for ordinary income
because each dollar of QBI displaces only 80 cents
of capital gains.
Taking into account the indirect effect of
capital gains on ordinary income leads to
surprising implications, of which I suggest three.
First, increasing the amount of capital gains can
increase the marginal rate on ordinary income.
Second, increasing the amount of ordinary
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income can decrease the marginal rate on
ordinary income. Third, holding total income
constant, increasing the proportion of income in
the form of capital gains can increase the marginal
rate on ordinary income.
The first implication is shown by the example
of Ordinary Couple and Capital Couple. Adding
$10,000 in capital gains to Ordinary Couple
turned them into Capital Couple and increased
their marginal rate on ordinary income from 12
percent to 27 percent by increasing the indirect
effect from 0 percent to 15 percent.
A slight modification of the same example can
be used to show the second implication — that
increased ordinary income can lead to lower
marginal rates. Assume that Capital Couple earns
an additional $10,000 in wages. Their ordinary
income will now be $80,000 and place them in the
22 percent bracket. Looking only at this direct
effect, their marginal rate on ordinary income will
have increased 10 percentage points. But given
their increased ordinary income, their first and
last dollar of capital gain are now in the same
bracket and, therefore, the indirect effect will have
dropped from 15 percent to 0 percent. Taking both
effects into account, their marginal rate will have
dropped from 27 percent to 22 percent because of
earning another $10,000 of ordinary income.42
The third claim — that holding income
constant, increasing the percentage of capital gain
can increase the marginal rate on ordinary income
— can be shown by a similar comparison.
Compare two couples, each with $80,000 of
taxable income. Assume the first couple has
$78,000 in ordinary income and $2,000 in capital
gain, while the second couple has $70,000 in
ordinary income and $10,000 in capital gain. The
first couple will face a marginal rate on ordinary
income of 22 percent, consisting of a direct effect
of 22 percent and no indirect effect. The second
couple with only $70,000 of ordinary income will
face a marginal rate of 27 percent: a direct effect of
12 percent from applying the ordinary rate

brackets, and an indirect effect of 15 percent from
having capital gain straddling the 0 percent and
15 percent brackets. Thus, the couple with a
smaller proportion of ordinary income will have
the higher tax rate on ordinary income.
These surprising results all flow from the way
that capital gains are stacked on top of ordinary
income. They demonstrate how, as the tax code
becomes ever more complex, its different parts
can interact in unexpected ways.


42

As a more extreme example, if the couple’s ordinary taxable income
was increased from $70,000 to $77,200 (rather than to $80,000), they
would still be in the 12 percent bracket, and their direct marginal rate on
ordinary income would still be 12 percent, while their indirect effect
would be 0 percent. Thus, the addition of $7,200 in ordinary income
would have lowered their marginal rate on ordinary income from 27
percent to 12 percent.
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